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Studies in 
Rural Finance 
Economics and Sociology 
Occasional Paper No. 1474 
DEBT, STABILIZATION, AND LIBERALIZATION IN COSTA RICA: 
POLITICAL ECONOMY RESPONSES TO A FISCAL CRISIS. 
by 
Claudio Gonzalez-Vega 
Revised Version 
May, 1988 
Agricultural Finance Program 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
and Rural Sociology 
The Ohio State University 
2120 Fyffe Road 
Columbus, Ohio 43210 
DEBT, STABILIZATION, AND LIBERALIZATION IN COSTA RICA: 
POLITICAL ECONOMY RESPONSES TO A FISCAL CRISIS. 
Claudio Gonzalez-Vega 
Recent papers by both macroeconomists and new political 
economy theorists --such as Corden (1987), Lal (1987), and Sri-
nivasan (1985)-- have begun to examine the impact of interest 
groups within an economy on the generation of fiscal and balance-
of-payments crises and on the success of stabilization-cum-liber-
alization efforts. Drawing on the Chilean experience, Edwards and 
Edwards (1987) have stressed that the explicit consideration of 
the behavior of decisive actors in the polity is critical for the 
choice of the timing, sequencing, and speed of implementation of 
policy reforms, if counter-productive behavior or the reversal of 
the policy orientation is to be avoided. As Calvo ( 1987) has 
shown, if liberalization efforts are perceived as temporary, they 
induce economic behavior that actually reduces the level of wel-
fare. Nelson (1984) also makes the point that the importance of 
considering political sustainability arises not only from the 
substantial welfare costs of failed programs but also because 
failure creates a legacy of cynicism that may seriously compli-
cate future liberalization efforts. 
Since second-best considerations arise when the existence of 
political and administrative constraints to the implementation of 
optimal policies is recognized, it is not surprising that few 
clear-cut guidelines for the construction of policy packages are 
possible. The analysis of specific episodes may then contribute 
to a better understanding of the ways in which political economy 
developments may influence the outcomes of policy decisions. This 
chapter is an attempt to provide an analytical political-economy 
history of the recent fiscal crisis in Costa Rica, an episode 
rich in lessons for similarly small open economies. 
I. Political Economy Background 
Among Latin American countries Costa Rica has been unique in 
terms of its political stability and the strength of its democra-
tic institutions. Sustained political stability has promoted eco-
nomic growth: it has favored investment, it has attracted foreign 
savings, and it has reduced the risks and transactions costs of 
economic activity by promoting an institutional infrastructure 
that has efficiently defined property rights and facilitated the 
enforcement of contracts. The absence of an army has released 
resources for education, health, and physical infrastructure. The 
emphasis on equity has reinforced human capital formation. As a 
result Costa Rica has enjoyed rapid economic growth, while its 
major indicators have reflected a higher quality of life than 
would be predicted for its per capita income level. Income in-
equality has been moderate and Costa Rica has been an example of 
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growth-cum-equity, as documented by Gonzalez-Vega and Cespedes 
(1987). 
Political stability and democratic participation have also 
contributed, on the other hand, to the consolidation of a multi-
tude of interest groups, to overconsumption, and to an increas-
ingly rigid deadlock of power shares, in a manner consistent with 
the analysis of Olson (1982). Education and social mobility have 
fueled rising expectations and growing demands for public-sector 
services. Combined with a strong concern for equity, these de-
mands have led to the institutionalization of numerous growth-re-
ducing fiscal entitlements and transfer payments. 
Promotion of manufacturing in the context of the Central 
American Common Market, for example, had initially accelerated 
growth in the 1960s as a result of increased trade. By the 1970s, 
however, the ·easy stages of import substitution had been ex-
hausted, new exports had been discouraged, distortions had slowed 
down the growth of productivity, and increasingly powerful inter-
est groups devoted scarce resources to directly unproductive ac-
tivities of the sort described by Bhagwati (1982). The accumula-
tion of entitlements added to the existing distortions, enlarged 
the public sector, and promoted bureaucratic controls and regula-
tions. The decentralized agencies and state-owned firms became 
pressure groups in their own right and claimed substantial shares 
of the available resources. 
Under the Oduber administration (1974-1978), CODESA, the 
public investment corporation, became an instrument for the 
state's intervention in productive activities in direct competi-
tion with the private sector. CODESA's non-restricted access to 
Central Bank credit became a major component of the deterioration 
of the public-sector finances. While CODESA's enterprises used 18 
percent of domestic credit, they contributed only 1.8 percent of 
gross domestic product and 0.3 percent of total employment. Be-
tween 1976 and 1983 none of CODESA's subsidiaries ever made a 
profit, while the accumulated losses (CR$ 2.059 million) repre-
sented 35 percent of all of their assets, as documented by Vargas 
(1987). 
Because CODESA was not restricted by the political controls 
typical of government agencies or by the profit discipline of 
private firms, the agency became a factory of quasi-rents. The 
larger the project, irrespective of profitability, the greater 
its political visibility and the larger the rents created. Never-
theless, Vega (1982) shows that competition with the private sec-
tor created tensions in the symbiotic relationship that had dev-
eloped between the state and the industrialists. By the end of 
the Oduber administration, an important group of manufacturing 
leaders left. Oduber 's political party and supported the election 
of Carazo (1978-1982), who would preside over the eruption of the 
economic crisis of the 1980s. 
.. 
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II. Determinants and Magnitude of the Crisis 
During the 1980s Costa Rica has experienced a major economic 
crisis, the result of a combination of unfavorable long-term 
trends and short-term circumstances, both foreign and domestic. 
The structural determinants of the crisis have reflected a con-
tradiction between the country's basic characteristics (a small 
domestic market, relative labor abundance, and very specialized 
natural resources) and features of the protectionist strategy of 
industrialization adopted in the late 1950s. High costs and dis-
tortions resulted from the penalization of agriculture and the 
anti-export bias of trade policies. The short-term determinants 
of the crisis have included, on the other hand, major external 
shocks as well as the unfortunate domestic policies adopted in 
response to those shocks, described in detail in GonzAlez-Vega 
(1984). 
The Costa Rican economy grew at a very satisfactory pace 
during the 1960s and 1970s. Between 1961 and 1979 the rates of 
growth of the real GDP and per capita GDP were 6.5 and 3.4 per-
cent per year. Moreover, Costa Rica did not experience inflation 
before the mid-1970s. For 1950-1970 average rates of change were 
1. o percent for the wholesale price index, 1. 8 percent for the 
GDP deflator, and 2.0 percent for the consumer price index. Dur-
ing the first oil shock the wholesale price index increased 40 
percent in 1974, but inflation was quickly brought under control. 
Fiscal and credit discipline sustained a fixed exchange rate re-
gime for a long period. 
In sharp contrast, during the 1980s Costa Rica has experi-
enced major economic difficulties. An economy that for over two 
decades had enjoyed rapid growth faced declining output and trade 
flows. The rate of growth of GDP dropped from 8.9 percent in 
1977 to - 7.3 percent in 1982. The decline of growth rates was 
shared by all sectors of economic activity and by all components 
of aggregate supply and demand. By 1982 fixed investment amounted 
to 49 percent of its 1979 level while imports represented 58 per-
cent of that earlier level. Both exports and imports declined and 
the country's trade deficit, which had grown from US$ 92 million 
in 1972 to US$ 522 million in 1980, had to be curtailed to US$ 23 
million by 1982. 
Before the 1980s Costa Rica had been successful in generat-
ing employment opportunities and in using its labor markets to 
distribute the fruits of growth. According to Garcia and Tockman 
(1985) Costa Rica had been the country in Latin America with the 
highest rate of growth of employment in modern, non-agricultural 
activities. Factor-price policies, however, had discouraged em-
ployment in the private sector and the public sector had increas-
ingly become the employer of last resort. Public-sector employ-
ment increased from 6 percent of the labor force in the early 
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1950s to 20 percent in the early 1980s. The large size of some 
ministries (e.g., Education) and of several autonomous institu-
tions had facilitated the creation of strong middle-class labor 
unions. While almost one-half of the public-sector workers were 
unionized by the late 1970s, the proportion was 10 percent for 
the total labor force. These unions had negotiated public-sector 
wages well above those for equivalent occupations in the private 
sector. 
With the cr1s1s open unemployment rates at least doubled, 
from 4.5 percent of the labor force in 1979 to 9.5 percent in 
1982, while underemployment increased substantially. From one-
digit rates in the late 1970s, inflation accelerated in the 
1980s. In 1981 the wholesale price index increased 65 percent and 
it rose another 108 percent in 1982. Once fiscal control was re-
gained, the rate of inflation declined to 8 percent in 1984. As 
a consequence of a declining level of output in the face of high 
inflation, by 1982 average real wages had dropped to 46 percent 
of their 1979 level. They still were at about two-thirds of that 
level by the end of 1984. 
III. External Shocks and Policy Management 
After 1973 Costa Rica experienced several major external 
shocks: two international oil crises, the coffee boom, a world 
recession, sharp changes in the country's degree of access to in-
ternational financial markets, the breakdown of trade with the 
Central American Common Market, and war, insurrection, political 
instability, and capital flight in Central America. The struc-
tural rigidities that had resulted from the protectionist stra-
tegy of development had created, in the meantime, an economic 
environment less conducive to quick and smooth adjustment to 
external shocks. In addition, unfortunate policy choices in 
response to the political economy pressures magnified the nega-
tive impacts of these shocks. As a result the country experi-
enced both substantial instability and a major impoverishment. 
The 1974 oil crisis had imposed the first major challenge of 
adjustment of recent times. It had been faced by the authorities 
with a rapid expansion of both domestic and foreign credit in or-
der to prevent the reduction of aggregate expenditures. The dete-
rioration of the international terms of trade, due to the higher 
import prices, was followed by an improvement of 45 percent in 
only two years {as the index rose from 79 in 1975 to 115 in 
1977), with the accompanying increase in real income during the 
coffee boom, and then by a 22 percent decline in three years 
(from 101 in 1978 to 79 in 1981). This wide fluctuation in rela-
tive prices and in real income imposed a drastic problem of ad-
justment on the economy. 
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Rapidly growing foreign borrowing on top of the extraordi-
nary expansion of export earnings during the coffee boom created 
new opportunities for the capture of quasi-rents and substantial-
ly increased all categories of aggregate spending. Consumption 
augmented rapidly, public-sector activities grew even more, and 
imports increased the most, reaching almost one-half of the ag-
gregate supply. All expenditure aggregates grew beyond levels 
that could be sustained under normal circumstances, much less 
during the recession that followed. 
The obviously transitory increase in income during the cof-
fee boom was treated as if it had resulted in a new, higher level 
of permanent income. This perception was strengthened by the rel-
ative success of the Costa Rican experiment and was celebrated 
with a spending euphoria. The government --already an interven-
tionist, welfare state-- became a major entrepreneur via the ac-
tivities of CODESA and gave little attention to the modification 
of tax structures or the mobilization of domestic savings through 
the financial system. The Oduber administration used the extra-
ordinary resources of the coffee boom, augmented by substantial 
borrowing abroad, to increase the size and role of the state and 
to strengthen the popularity of the president. Just before the 
end of the Oduber administration very short-term borrowing was 
undertaken in order to pile up over U.S. $300 million of inter-
national monetary reserves. These loans had to be paid back a 
few months after the new Carazo administration took office. 
While the end of the coffee boom, the deterioration of the 
country's international terms of trade, and the world recession 
required a major adjustment of the Costa Rican economy, the gov-
ernment found it difficult to bring the rate of growth of aggre-
gate expenditures downwards to a level consistent with the new 
circumstances. Import capacity was curtailed by the reduction in 
export earnings and in private capital inflows due to political 
instability in Central America, but the required austerity 
encountered much political opposition. 
The powerful manufacturing sector had become extremely de-
pendent on imported inputs as a consequence of the prevailing 
structure of effective protection and was prepared to defend its 
entitlements. The strong public-sector unions, on the other hand, 
were ready to block any attempt at fiscal control. Numerous or-
ganized groups struggled to maintain their standard of living, 
aided by the government's expansionary credit policies. 
Based on a weak coalition, the Carazo administration did not 
oppose the efforts of the more powerful interest groups to avoid 
the direct impact of the adjustment. Rather, the authorities 
chose to postpone the adjustment by borrowing heavily from 
abroad. Costa Rica's public external debt, which had amounted to 
U.S. $164 million in 1970 increased to US$ 3,419 by 1984, at an 
annual rate of 24 percent, to become one of the highest external 
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debts in the world, in per capita terms. The motto of the Carazo 
administration was "ride the wave of foreign debt to the maxi-
mum." 
The stock of accumulated fiscal deficits financed abroad, 
however, eventually reached the limit that foreign lenders were 
wi 11 ing to accept. When capital inf lows began to dry up, the 
authorities expanded domestic credit even more rapidly in order 
to sustain the level of spending of the public sector. Eventual-
ly a moratorium on the debt service became an additional mech-
anism for not fully facing the consequences of the fiscal dis-
equilibrium. The resulting inflationary pressures led to the 
loss of the stock of international monetary reserves and to addi-
tional borrowing abroad in order to replenish those reserves. 
Once those reserves were exhausted and access to foreign funds 
ceased, domestic inflation accelerated. When the revenues from 
the inflation tax declined, as a result of currency substitution 
and other mechanisms of evasion, the private sector was crowded 
out from domestic credit portfolios. The proportion of domestic 
credit for the private sector declined from 81 percent in 1975 to 
55 percent. This crowding out accentuated the decline in output, 
as reported by Blejer and Khan (1985) for similar situations. 
The accompanying financial repression led to a significant 
contraction of the domestic financial system in real terms, as 
documented in detail in Gonzalez-Vega (1985). In constant prices, 
by 1982 the narrow money supply (Ml} dropped to 56 percent of its 
1978 value, while a broader measure of the money supply (M2} de-
clined to 69 percent of its 1978 value. Moreover, by 1982 total 
domestic credit was 42 percent of its 1980 value while credit for 
the private sector reached only 36 percent of its 1978 level. Do-
mestic credit for the public sector continued to increase through 
1980, but then it also declined. By 1982 domestic credit to the 
public sector reached only 46 percent of its 1980 level. In the 
race between inflation and the expansion of credit for the public 
sector, the former was the easy winner. 
As a result of the government's inability to undertake ap-
propriate measures to reduce the fiscal deficits and of the fear 
to the political costs of an outright devaluation, exchange-rate 
management became chaotic. In 1980 the free-market rate of the 
parallel market at the Stock Exchange had begun to diverge from 
the fixed official rate. By September the authorities moved to 
an institutionalized multiple-rate system. By December a float-
ing-rate regime was adopted. By March 1981 a banking rate, to be 
administered by the Central Bank, was introduced in addition to 
the free-market and official rates. The official devaluation did 
not come until December. The new rate was set, however, at less 
than one-half of the prevailing free-market rate. In July 1982 
the parallel market was prohibited and the new authorities began 
a process of convergence of the banking and official exchange 
rates. A crawling-peg system was adopted once convergence was 
.. 
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achieved. With the collapse of the fixed-rate regime, the ex-
change rate had increased from CR $8.60 per U.S. dollar in early 
1981 to CR $62.40 in mid-1982. It was unified at CR $42.50 by 
the end of 1983 and it reached CR$ 58.60 by the end of 1986. 
Experimentation with all kinds of exchange-rate practices, 
taxes and subsidies, import and exchange controls, prior depo-
sits, and other policy instruments reflected the weakness of the 
authorities and the strength of the interest groups. This situa-
tion led to frequent changes in the rules of the game, increasing 
uncertainty, and the creation of hybrid systems that lacked any 
internal logic. Numerous policy reversals, exceptions, and privi-
leges were continuously added in response to the political pres-
sures from rent-seeking groups. Eventually few people understood 
the system, while major distortions in resource allocation and 
inequities in wealth distribution resulted. A large bureaucracy 
had to be hired at the Central Bank in order to administer the 
system, while numerous legal battles were the consequence of the 
complexity and prevailing confusion about the correct interpreta-
tion of contradictory regulations. Arbitrariness and complexity 
significantly increased uncertainty and the social costs of the 
measures. 
IV. Political Economy of the Crisis 
The Costa Rican balance-of-payments crisis has essentially 
been a crisis for the public sector and it has reflected a mis-
judgment about its appropriate and feasible size and composition. 
The increased level of government expenditures and income trans-
fers that resulted from the coffee boom was not sustainable over 
the long run. While there is a possibility that the authorities 
simply misjudged the size of the future foreign-exchange flows 
and committed themselves to unsustainable consumption-support 
programs, the bulk of the overexpansion may be attributed to the 
political economy pressures. 
Political stability and democratic participation had pro-
moted the creation of entitlements to current and future income 
streams for a multitude of interest groups (industrialists, pub-
lic-sector workers, social-security beneficiaries, small-farmer 
borrowers, rice growers, and cattle ranchers). Given the legal 
formality of the Costa Rican system, such entitlements had been 
institutionalized as specific "property rights." This institu-
tionalization, in the form of revenue earmarking and legal spend-
ing requirements, had in turn reduced the discretionary powers of 
the authorities and had limited their flexibility to adjust to 
changes in the economic environment. In order to meet growing 
demands for services and transfers, new sources of revenues had 
to be sought to support an ever increasing public sector. In ad-
dition, the predominant position of the nationalized banks in the 
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financial system made it possible to direct domestic credit to 
the financing of public-sector activities and income transfers. 
With the coffee boom a particularly large set of new pro-
grams and transfers had been created, but retrenchment looked po-
litically costly when the boom was over. Social peace was per-
ceived as being highly dependent on the preservation of entitle-
ments to public-sector services and income transfers. The coun-
try's political equilibrium had been built around those "rights." 
This not only made policy reforms difficult, but it also guaran-
teed that the impact of the crisis would be suffered the most by 
the politically least powerful segments of society. 
V. The Role of Poreign Borrowing 
Access to foreign financing during a balance-of-payments 
crisis is generally believed to be welfare improving because it 
permits the smoothing of consumption during a period when policy 
reforms can be undertaken. Underlying this belief is an implicit 
assumption that the feasibility of the policy reforms and the be-
havior of the authorities are independent of the inflow of for-
eign funds. The recent experience of Costa Rica suggests that--
given the interactions between the political economy pressures, 
the behavior of the authorities, and the availability of foreign 
funds-- ample access to external borrowing may not be welfare 
improving. 
During the early stages of the crisis the reduction in the 
economy's real income necessitated the adoption of expenditure-
reducing policies and measures to reduce the size of the fiscal 
deficit, but the authorities chose to transform the fiscal defi-
cit into a foreign debt issue by persuading foreign lenders to 
extend more credit, even in the absence of a consistent stabil-
ization-cum-liberalization program. Foreign borrowing then became 
the cornerstone of macroeconomic policy management. 
This approach was unfortunate. The decision to increase the 
foreign debt seriously compromised future growth for the sake of 
sustaining an artificial level of consumption for a few addition-
al years. Although the foreign debt has since been renegotiated, 
its service has introduced balance-of-payments constraints that, 
even under relatively favorable predictions about the behavior of 
domestic savings, will inevitably result in lower rates of growth 
of output, as Ortiz and Serra (1983) have emphasized. Levels of 
debt service close to one-half of the value of exports and to 15 
percent of GDP, in a country where domestic savings hardly 
reached 10 percent of GDP in the past, will significantly limit 
investment and the flow of inputs required by the highly import-
intensive manufacturing and agricultural sectors. 
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The implied intertemporal income redistribution has been on-
ly one of the impacts of postponing the adjustment through debt. 
Access to foreign financing strengthened the reluctance to deval-
ue, even when the col6n had become grossly overvalued. This re-
sulted in substantial implicit and explicit subsidies for those 
with access to the underpriced foreign exchange. The beneficia-
ries were not only those classes with a high import content in 
their consumption patterns, but particularly those who were able 
to transform a large portion of their portfolios of wealth into 
foreign assets. That is, public foreign borrowing and a fixed ex-
change rate that overvalued the domestic currency resulted in a 
subsidy to private capital flight for those with sufficient liq-
uid resources to be able to speculate against the col6n and for 
those for whom the transactions costs of foreign-asset purchases 
were sufficiently low. 
The returns froa externally borrowed resources were thereby 
privatized while service of the foreign debt was socialized. In-
deed, in order to amortize and pay interest on this debt, the 
public sector has been forced to increase public-utility rates 
and social-security contributions while it has drastically cut 
back on the supply of services. Thus, while the beneficiaries of 
the postponement were those capable of investing abroad, the 
losers have been the marginal groups now deprived of public-sec-
tor services in areas such as health and education. The shares 
in the burden of the adjustment responded, therefore, to the po-
litical and economic strength of the distribution coalitions of 
interest groups. 
VI. Policy Feedbacks: The Central Bank's Losses 
The Carazo administration's refusal to devalue was a clear 
example of a generalized policy paralysis in response to the im-
mediate political costs of action, as compared to uncertain bene-
fits that stretched beyond its term. Policy paralysis did not 
mean lack of intervention, however. Rather, a multitude of ad 
hoc measures substituted for a consistent stabilization program. 
These interventions, moreover, created new distortions and im-
balances which required new interventions. This process of re-
sponding to the unexpected consequences of earlier policy deci-
sions with new interventions frequently led to intractable vi-
cious circles that made macroeconomic management increasingly 
difficult by gradually reducing the degrees of freedom of the 
authorities. Thus, the decision to increase the public external 
debt created flows of amortization and interest that would in-
f late future fiscal budgets, thereby reducing the scope for dis-
cretionary spending. Similarly, the granting of foreign-exchange 
entitlements resulted in a flow of Central Bank losses which have 
become the major source of monetary expansion in Costa Rica. 
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In 1985, for example, the Central Bank losses amounted to CR 
$10,381 million (about U.S. $208 million). This amount was 
equivalent to 5.6 percent of GDP and to 22 percent of the value 
of exports. The Central Bank losses represented three-quarters 
of the consolidated public-sector deficit, including the Central 
Bank. Thus, as Loria (1986) has also noted, the aost important 
component of the fiscal deficit has been located, not at the Mi-
nistry of Pinance, but at the Central BanJt itself. 
The Central Bank losses originate mainly from differences 
between interest earned and interest paid and from the Central 
Bank's foreign-exchange operations. They reflect the feedback of 
earlier policy decisions, mostly related to the granting of enti-
tlements. For example, a substantial queue of foreign-exchange 
requests by potential importers had accumulated in 1981 at the 
time when an Extended Facility Agreement was signed with the IMF. 
This agreement forced the Central Bank to substitute U.S. dollar-
denominated, interest-earning deposit certificates for the enti-
tlements in the queue at the prevailing exchange rate. The bene-
ficiaries, in turn, sold these certificates at the Stock Ex-
change. 
In general, losses from its foreign-exchange transactions 
resulted when the Central Bank exchanged foreign resources that 
it had borrowed for assets denominated in domestic currency. The 
Bank's own foreign debt expanded rapidly as the institution was 
called upon to finance the public-sector deficit and the commer-
cial bank's credit expansion, in view of the contraction of do-
mestic deposit mobilization. The Bank borrowed from foreign com-
mercial banks, placed floating-rate notes abroad, and paid above-
market interest rates on deposits in foreign currency. The Bank 
accepted the foreign-exchange risk on its own debt as well as on 
the debt of the state-owned commercial banks. These losses were 
compounded by the sales of foreign exchange to public-sector 
agencies at subsidized rates and by exchange-rate subsidies to 
the private sector for "essential" imports. The monetary impact 
of the revaluation in domestic currency of the external debt has 
so far been postponed through debt renegotiations. Nevertheless, 
the losses implicit in this revaluation will increase automatic-
ally through time with devaluation. 
In order to sterilize the consequences of excessive domestic 
credit expansion, the Central Bank has undertaken open-market op-
erations by issuing its own stabilization bonds. The high inter-
est rates needed to compete in this market have further increased 
the Bank's interest expenditures. The costs of monetary stabil-
ization have represented 25 percent of the Bank's losses. In or-
der to reduce these losses, while at the same time keep control 
over the expansion of domestic credit, the Central Bank has more 
recently attempted to substitute other policy measures, such as 
increased reserve requirements and non-interest-earning prior im-
port deposits, for these open-market operations. 
. . 
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These interventions have been insufficient, however, in view 
of the extent of the monetary disequilibrium. The sales of stab-
ilization bonds have continued to grow. Unfortunately, while in a 
particular year the Central Bank may sterilize a domestic credit 
expansion with sales of its stabilization bonds at high interest 
rates (recently between 25 and 30 percent), such actions auto-
matically increase the future growth of the monetary base in the 
amount of the interest payments to service those bonds. Moreover, 
once reserve requirements became too high --in the sense dis-
cussed by McKinnon and Mathieson (1981)-- their further use has 
been very limited. The Central Bank losses have, therefore, con-
strained the Bank in the use of two of its most important policy 
instruments: open-market operations and reserve requirements. 
After renegotiation of the country's external debt, the Cen-
tral Bank became the only borrower from the foreign banks, for 
all past and new debt. The Central Government, autonomous insti-
tutions, and nationalized banks, in turn, borrow from the Central 
Bank. When these institutions do not service their debt in time, 
the payments arrears become an additional mechanism for the 
forced financing of the fiscal deficit by the Central Bank. Thus, 
the effort to centralize all of the country's external debt at 
the Central Bank in order to control its rate of expansion and 
facilitate renegotiations backfired and, as a result, further 
constraints limit the actions of the monetary authorities. The 
centralization of foreign borrowing led to the loss of the Cen-
tral Bank's autonomy and it transformed a foreign-debt problem 
into a monetary-expansion problem. The Central Bank cannot levy 
other taxes in order to pay for its losses; it can only collect 
the inflation tax through money creation. 
The Central Bank also paid Costa Rican exporters for their 
sales to Central American countries, but it has not received pay-
ment from these nations, as reported by Brock and Mel~ndez in 
this volume. Since payment of such entitlements to exporters im-
plied an addition to the monetary base, the Central Bank sought 
to sterilize it with sales of stabilization bonds, thereby fur-
ther increasing its losses. 
Traditionally, inflationary pressures resulted from the ex-
pansion of domestic credit in order to finance a public-sector 
deficit. In recent years, however, the Central Bank's losses have 
been a more important source of monetary expansion. This expan-
sion of the monetary base has not been reflected in the balance 
sheet of the institution as an expansion of domestic credit, 
however, but as an expansion of net other assets which, in turn, 
reflects the Central Bank's losses. This expansion has reflected 
the extent to which monetary policy has become hostage to the f i-
nancial needs of the public sector. From a position of main 
architect of the country's economic policies, the Central Bank 
has become a passive source of funds for the financing of the ex-
plicit fiscal deficit and the implicit credit and foreign-ex-
12 
change subsidies. In the political economy struggle among insti-
tutions, the interests of the other agencies have prevailed over 
those of the monetary authority. Central Bank losses have re-
flected this diversion of the institution's energies toward areas 
not typical of a monetary authority. 
In order to mitigate the inflationary consequences of the 
accompanying monetary expansion, the Central Bank has been forced 
to crowd out the private sector from bank credit portfolios. The 
financial system has become, therefore, less of an intermediary 
between private savers and investors and more of a fiscal instru-
ment to finance the public sector. 
VII. Pinancial Reforms 
Since its creation in the 1950s, topes de cartera (ceilings 
on the amount of credit outstanding by bank and by economic ac-
tivity) had been the main instrument of Central Bank policy in 
Costa Rica. With these ceilings the authorities had attempted to 
influence both resource allocation and the rate of expansion of 
domestic credit. This system had become increasingly vulnerable 
to political pressures as interest groups actively engaged in ef-
forts to increase the level of the ceilings on the loans for 
their particular lines of activity and as inflation increased the 
subsidy implicit in the preferential interest rates set by the 
Central Bank for priority sectors. 
By the end of 1978, however, the Carazo administration un-
dertook a partial financial reform. Interest rates were raised 
to positive levels in real terms and became competitive with 
rates paid on foreign financial assets. In response to the fi-
nancial reform the ratio of bank deposits to GDP increased 
sharply, in reflection of a high interest elasticity of financial 
assets. In the presence of a growing fiscal deficit, however, 
the shortcomings of a partial reform became evident. A reluc-
tance to similarly raise the interest rates paid on government 
bonds led to a major portfolio shift from bonds to bank deposits. 
This further reduced the ability of the public sector to finance 
its deficit by placing its own paper in the market for securi-
ties. Instead, the fiscal deficit was increasingly financed with 
foreign and domestic bank credit. Thus, while the interest-rate 
reform stimulated deposit mobilization through the banking sys-
tem, the private sector was crowded out of the bank credit port-
folios. The explosive fiscal disequilibrium of subsequent years 
resulted in interest rates not adjusted sufficiently to account 
for the high rates of inflation and in financial repression. As a 
consequence, financial reform acquired a bad reputation. 
Given the multiple determinants of the crisis, when Monge 
(1982-1986) took over from the Carazo administration the authori-
ties faced three interrelated issues: (a) how to redefine the 
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strategy of development in order to return to the high-growth 
path of the previous decades; (b) how to eliminate the fiscal 
disequilibrium in order to stabilize domestic prices, employment, 
and the exchange rate; and (c) how to distribute the costs of the 
adjustment across the various segments of society in order to mi-
tigate the impact of the crisis on the weakest, to maintain in-
ternal peace in a turbulent region, and to protect Costa Rica's 
democratic institutions. Protection of the country's unusual so-
cial contract was viewed as essential to guarantee a climate con-
ducive to renewed investment and growth. This multiplicity of 
objectives raised difficult questions about the timing, sequenc-
ing, and speed of the policy interventions. 
The authorities chose to concentrate their efforts on stab-
ilization. One cannot seriously think about structural reforms 
if the power needed to stabilize the economy is not there. More-
over, as Camacho and Gonzalez-Vega (1985) discuss, stabilization 
required a decisive shock treatment in order to break up highly 
unstable expectations concerning inflation and exchange-rate de-
valuation. Stabilization required control over the public-sector 
deficit, a reduction in the rate of domestic credit expansion, 
and renegotiation the foreign debt. With fiscal and monetary dis-
cipline, the rates of inflation and of devaluation were brought 
under control. Stabilization also resulted from renewed capital 
inflows. 
Substantial amounts of foreign assistance have been forth-
coming and have played a major role in channeling inflationary 
pressures towards the balance of payments. By itself U. s. AID 
assistance increased from U.S. $13 million in 1981 to $212 mil-
lion in 1983. In the absence of some fiscal and monetary dis-
cipline, no feasible amount of foreign financial assistance would 
have stabilized prices and the exchange rate. These large inflows 
of foreign savings may have retarded, on the other hand, the 
adoption of structural reforms required to guarantee the long-
run sustainability of the stabilization efforts. I.n particular, 
the willingness to reduce not only the size and role of the pub-
1 ic sector but also the degree of protectionism may have been 
weakened by the implicit bail out. 
Since 1984 the Central Bank, under the leadership of Eduardo 
Lizano, has slowly undertaken another financial reform. The ceil-
ings on the amounts of credit by activity were gradually elimi-
nated and the banks were allowed greater independence in the set-
ting of their interest rates. The scope of credit subsidies was 
specifically defined and limited. Automatic access to Central 
Bank credit by CODESA and other autonomous institutions was elim-
inated. An increasing scope was provided for the activities of 
the private commercial banks in competition with the state-owned 
banks. The Central Bank attempted to regulate monetary expansion 
with reserve requirements and open market operations, as ex-
plained by Lizano (1987). Despite its success in containing the 
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losses of the Central Bank and in changing the behavior of the 
state-owned banks towards a more market-oriented attitude, this 
partial deregulatiori also resulted in a very large increase in 
commercial and personal credit, that was stimulated by tariff 
reductions and a larger car import quota, and in reductions in 
loans to productive sectors, particularly agriculture, which had 
to be disbursed at a subsidized interest rate. The banks also 
soon learned to bypass reserve requirements with creative inno-
vations so that domestic credit --and, as a result, imports--
increased more than had been expected. These unexpected adverse 
consequences fueled opposition to the reforms. 
Lizano's strategy had been to introduce the reforms gradual-
ly and slowly in order to minimize political opposition. Gradual-
ism, however, allowed time for those hurt by the elimination of 
the subsidies to combine and exert increasing pressure for the 
reversal of the policy reforms. Opposition came, in particular, 
from the agricultural sector, which had recently enjoyed substan-
tial price, credit, insurance, and other subsidies. As Mesalles 
(1988) discusses, the situation became politically sensitive when 
droughts and a reductions in the international price of several 
export crops created a crisis in the agricultural sector. Legis-
lation was approved in Congress to reschedule most delinquent 
agricultural loans at subsidized interest rates. For 1988, the 
Central Bank set a limit of five percent on credit expansion by 
bank and a portfolio limit of 30 percent on personal, commercial, 
and service-sector loans. The Executive branch, in turn, imposed 
specific credit limits, by activities, on the state-owned banks, 
bypassing the Central Bank. Strong political economy pressures 
may lead to a reversal of the most appropriate liberalization 
attempts of Governor Lizano. 
.. 
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